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27 Aug 2018
'Trumpets' race report - Belgian GP

Matt 'Trumpets' Ragsdale takes us through the ins and outs of the Belgian GP in only the way he can.
Ambient 17° Track 29° Humidity 38% Wind 1.1 m/s

Prelude

It was a sunny day in Belgium, which when translated means the skies were gray it was a bit chill and the weather was entirely suspicious.... Carlos Sainz and Stoffel Vandoorne both received new Power Units and other associated bits (along with associated penalties, natch) due to their entirely poor qualifying, suggesting that perhaps the teams MIGHT want to rethink those incentives. Renault did decide to start Sainz on the Medium tyre, which will no doubt be watched VERY closely in the Ferrari and Mercedes garages. Nevertheless, the supremely mixed up grid was the focal point as the extended grid walk played out in telly broadcasts around the world.

Formula 1 published a wonderful comparison of fastest laps between Hamilton and Vettel on their Q3 laps and of particular note was the fact that even in the rain, Vettel had the quicker run down to Eau Rouge, as well as most of Sector 3. This will make for some interesting racing on the first lap should both parties make the first turn unscathed, even before one considers the generally superior start that Ferrari has, or the fact that Vettel is actually starting more on the racing line, albeit with Lewis on his inside and slightly ahead...

Ferrari also seemed to have an advantage on the Medium tyre in the long run, at least in FP2 and that would seem to mean that they might be able to pull off the vaunted one stop, beloved of the teams but that F1 has been trying to banish through tyre magic the last few years. Mark Hughes, in Motorsport Magazine, did an analysis that suggested this was unlikely, but such is the pace difference between the sharp end and the rest it's entirely within the realm of possibility that they could go slow enough to one stop and still be miles ahead by time the chequers fly.

Pre-race radio from Hamilton to Mercedes discussing his set-up was particularly interesting, as they weighed the benefits of "taking out half a hole from the front wing" (Somers - it's easier for them to talk in holes on the adjuster, rather than in degrees, as then the information is also semi-coded too) along with the balance being "on the nose" and "diff settings already high" because of the headwind. All of which suggests, not surprisingly, that barring weather and accidents, this is a race that will come down to tyre and energy management, an exquisite but difficult to appreciate dance between the driver, team and track.

Mercedes look to be running more downforce relative to Ferrari, and the fact that the Silver Arrows were quickest in S2, vs Ferrari in S1 and S3 seemed to confirm that fact. A true battle of the titans approached, different designs, different set ups battling for supremacy in the Constructors, as the drivers readied themselves to lay it all on the line.

Summary

Lights Out!!!! Tremendous start by Ocon, Hamilton held the lead into La Source, and then scene stealer Alonso was airborne, flying sideways and landing directly atop Leclerc. On replay it was Hulkenberg who smashed into the back of Alonso that inititiated the aerobatic sequence, as Vettel chased Hamilton down the Kemmel straight, popped out of the slipstream and rocked by Hamilton with ease. Ocon behind had a serious go up the inside for the lead into La Source, also working the slipstream for all it was worth, but was forced to back out and wound up losing both 2nd to Hamilton and 3rd to his teammate once he was through the turn. Puncture for Raikkonen and the Safety Car was out. Ricciardo limped it into the pits with a destroyed rear wing and the running order was Vettel, Hamilton, Perez, Ocon, Verstappen, Grosjean, Magnussen, Gasly, Ericsson and Sirotkin in the points.

The Safety Car, which had been running through the pitlane as the debris was cleared, was called in end of lap 4 and of interest were Raikkonen P14, negating Ferrari's WCC advantage and Bottas P16 and apparently on a two stop strategy, based on the early radio calls. Ricciardo made it out, 2 laps down but still in it as he tagged on before the Safety Car was in.

And Vettel was in charge with Lewis directly on his gearbox, but a little lock up into the Bus Stop gave Sebastian the breathing room he needed into La Source. Lots of pressure but little passing, crucially though Bottas, who swapped onto Supers lap 3 under the Safety Car, was by Raikkonen, whose car also suffered some damage in the first lap incident.

Into the second sector, and Vettel already had 1.6 seconds over Hamilton as Mercedes entered its wheelhouse, but there was nothing in it for Hamilton who seemed primarily to be able to limit the damage. Looking mighty in P3 and P4 were the Force Indias, although Verstappen, having made it by the HAAS duo, was within DRS of Ocon.

Up to the Kemmel straight they went, Ocon covered the inside but moved outside as he saw Max coming, but it was a dummy and up the inside went Verstappen, into Les Combes and off in search of Perez. Lap 8 and Raikkonen was back in as apparently something at the back was less than optimimum. Off he went on his Mediums, EVEN more time lost due to the exigencies of circumstance.

The following lap, at the sharp end, Vettel was slowly trying to ease out of the undercut, now 2.8 seconds up as no doubt the boffins on the Mercedes pit wall scratched their head and hoped for rain. The end of the lap also saw the end of Raikkonen's race as whatever was wrong with his car proved terminal. Verstappen meanwhile had grabbed onto the DRS of Perez, and breezed by down the start finish straight.

Alonso gave an interview meanwhile in which he cast serious shade at Hulkenberg for the accident, though the possibility of a mechanical failure for the Renault had yet to be excluded, with Palmer on 5 Live saying it looked to be a brake failure (post race, Hulkenberg admitted it was a straight up mistake). Hamilton, meanwhile, had given up the ghost and was running more than a second slower than Vettel on lap 12, with Verstappen in the Red Bull now making time as Hamilton looked to be saving tyres for whatever strategy his pitwall had cooked up for him. Further back, the dynamic duo of Bottas and Ricciardo (who was 2 laps down) had progressed quietly and unobtrusively up the field and were in P10 and, confusingly, P16 even though they were running nose to tail as the Red Bull gradually unlapped itself by following the Mercedes driver through the field.

2 laps later and Hamilton turned it back up, matching Vettel's time almost to the hundredth as the pit stop window prepared to open for the two stoppers. The biggest outliers in the top 10 were Ericsson and Gasly, P10 and P9 respectively, who were being tracked down by the Bottas/Ricciardo team. Raikkonen was reported to have a DRS and broken rear diffuser from his contact with the front wing of Ricciardo in the first turn of the race and as Vettel crossed the line for lap 16 it was Hamilton seizing fast lap.

The following lap, Bottas rocked it by Ericsson down the Kemmel straight and Ericsson was told to try and use Valterri to get by Gasly. Ricciardo, meanwhile had come up against the limits of his damaged machine, and the pit wall told him if he could find a few tenths, and given the need to pit by those ahead, he might yet be able to salvage a point or two. This seemed to ignore the fact that he was 2 laps down, but clearly Red Bull had some reason they wanted him to carry on so he dutifully sallied forth and at the end of lap 19 had managed to get by Ericsson as he thrashed his wounded machine round the track.

Lap 20 and a blister line had appeared on the left rear of Hamilton's tyre, but despite that, he was beginning to eat the lead that Vettel had created, nibbling a tenth or two a lap and just about to be inside 3 seconds on the Ferrari. By contrast, the tyres on the Ferrari looked to be untroubled and lap 22 Mercedes pulled the trigger, into the pits and out on the Softs went Hamilton with a supremely swift stop. A dead push lap for Vettel and he was in as well, also onto the Softs and out as Hamilton was already 1.6 seconds quicker than the Ferrari. Out he went but Verstappen, running longer, wound up getting in the way of Hamilton's charge and that created the gap that Vettel needed. Lewis was by Max down the Kemmel straight and as they headed through Les Combes and down the hill into Mercedes' strengths he was well within DRS of Vettel. But with his tyres up to temperature, Vettel was able to easily use S3 to his advantage and as they wound through the Bus Stop, it was 1.6 seconds and clear of DRS for the Ferrari as they set off on lap 24.

Further down the field the pitstops continued to roll, with Grosjean in next, the Safety Car having effectively neutered thoughts of a two stop for most of the field. Ocon was in the following lap to cover off the HAAS driver, but it wasn't really that close, as he was out in front of Ericsson with a 10 seconds of free air ahead, while Grosjean was trapped behind the Swede. Perez was told to wring the neck of the car, in for a slow stop and the concern being that he would wind up behind Ocon and there would be complaining the entire rest of the race due to the undercut.

Thankfully, that didn't come to pass and as they headed off in search of lap 27, Vettel had once again stretched his lead out to 3.2 seconds as Verstappen finally came in and was out on the Softs. Hamilton was told that tyre wear was not an issue, just the blistering. Reassuring, maybe not so much.

Thankfully, for those who don't like to watch tyres to see if they might be blistering, a rather entertaining duel was developing between the Toro Rosso of Hartley and the Sauber of Ericsson. A bit of dicing and Hartley emerged the victor, at least momentarily as Ericsson retained DRS as they flashed down the hill and towards the bus stop.

Lap 30 and Bottas was in, again with blistering on the rears and was off with a set of Softs, his mission to track down Perez and Ocon and take possession of P4, the best possible barring Verstappen's PU lunching itself. Ricciardo was called in to retire the following lap and save the mileage, and the disappointment was palpable in his reply.

2 laps later and Bottas was within striking distance of the first Force India, job done lap 33 after a decent show of resistance from the Force India driver. Perez was up next for the Mercedes driver as Sainz gradually tried to reclaim some glory for Renault, up to P11 with a pass on Sirotkin and 6 seconds to the points.

3 laps later and Bottas was under 4 seconds to Perez, who was thrashed trying to maintain P4 from the approaching behemoth. The team told him the tyres were good for 10 laps at the pace he was running, good news as there were only 7 laps left in the race. Turning into the next lap, suddenly Bottas was on equal pace, whether down to tyres or the need to restore the ERS or straight up fuel, it was looking much better for the plucky Force India driver.

It was a momentary breather, though, likely battery recharge for Bottas then as the next lap saw the gap halved and Bottas once again significantly faster. 1.7 seconds as they were halfway around lap 39 and it was right around a second as he was still far enough back that Perez didn't need to defend seriously into La Source.

Down the hill they went, and Bottas was then well into DRS as they tipped over into the following lap. Through Eau Rouge and Raidillon and then rocketing down the Kemmel straight the job was done, P4 and a significant boost for Mercedes in the Constructors with the retirement of Raikkonen putting Ferrari into difficulty early on. AS they stood, it would be 18 points for the nascent Force India team, enough to overhaul Williams straight out of the box.

But the rest of the race was just to be a slow unwinding of the remaining laps, no drama, no fuss. At its heart the race amounted to the first lap, the laps around the pitstops and a long running Verstappen that tipped the balance (more?) in favor of the Scuderia winning, but the gutting loss of Raikkonen may ultimately have turned out to be the biggest shift as instead of clawing into the lead of Mercedes in the Constructors, they actually lost ground to the Silver Arrows. A small star for Marcus Ericsson as well, as his 10th place finish kept Sauber a solitary point ahead of the newly minted Force India team as the chequers flew and the race rolled into the history books.

With Monza looming next week, a somewhat different challenge awaits the teams, and with tyres less an issue a straighter comparison between the two Power Units should be possible. A look at the tyres of the parked Mercedes showed they threw in the towel fairly soon after the pitstops, a fact confirmed by Vettel in the post race interviews. Worrying times for Mercedes, though, with Lewis flat out referring to a trick of the Ferrari being responsible for it's ferocious performance. HAAS had a good day, up 10 points and within 6 now of Renault, whose disastrous start and qualifying robbed them of any chance at points. The new engine for Sainz, however, means they will be targeting Monza to make their play as the Formula B championship hots up (credit Kmag for that terminology). Equally close is the best of the rest in the Driver's, with Magnussen a mere 3 points back of Hulkenberg and quite the scrap looming at the top of the midfield, especially with Force India (finally with some proper funding thanks to Papa Stroll) back in it to play spoiler...

Discuss!!!

And remember to play nice in the comments!!
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25 Aug 2018
'Trumpets' qually notebook - Belgian GP

  • Saturday, August 25, 2018
  • 1
Matt 'Trumpets' Ragsdale takes us through the action that unfolded in qualifying at Spa-Francorchamps this afternoon.

Ambient 14° 
Track 28° 
Humidity 54% 
Wind 0.6 m/s

Prelude

As the F1 world shook sand and saltwater out of their ears after a seemingly interminable summer break, the legal brouhaha over the team formerly known as Force India savagely swallowed all the headlines about clever engine updates (Ferrari, new MGU-H and Turbo, Mercedes new spec) expensive new fuels (Ferrari again, perhaps not every team with a PU from the Scuderia can afford it, could be a legal tactic going forward to keep the sharp end sharp given current FIA regs) and of course the flash new wheels brought by Mercedes to help them with their tyre temperatures.

Instead it's been a silly season frenzy kicked off by rumours that now Papa Stroll owned Force India, wunderkind Lance would be ditching the problematic Williams for a newer, faster team, complexified by the shock announcement of Ricciardo deciding his future lay with Enstone, not Milton Keynes. Of course, that set off a firestorm that was rather immediately complicated by the fact that Stroll had merely bought the assets of the former team, and not the company itself, necessitating a brand new entry that was negotiated at the 11th hour and stamped approved by the FIA less than 24 hours before FP1 kicked off (and notwithstanding legal rumblings about the fairness of the administration decisions from one of the rather well heeled spurned suitors).

The current facts are Ricciardo to Renault, Sainz to McLaren, Gasly to RBR, Stroll to Force India (which shall be used for continuity purposes for the remainder of the season) eventually, and of course, Alonso off to some other motorsport entirely. Beyond that we have Perez likely staying, Ocon going (maybe Macca) Kubica finishing out Stroll's contract at Williams (hype train!!!) and Vandoorne possibly at Toro Rosso, or then again not. Ah yes, and don't forget the possibility that James Key will wind up at McLaren once the Faenza team extracts the appropriate amount of blood. Whew, glad that's over....

Vandoorne, whose season has been torrid and for whom speculation has been rife, decided to demonstrate his remarkable skills (he is dead in the middle of teammates vs Alonso stats wise, so not as bad as current telly has led everyone to believe) during FP3 by keeping his car mostly out of the barrier after Bottas, for reasons mostly having to do with "ooops" put him on the grass down the Kemmel straight. Starting at the back, the likely penalty will have little effect, unless of course he is required to use a Williams instead. He will be joined there by Hulkenberg, both taking on enough new bits to put them there.

Vettel led the way for FP3, but by barely a tenth so pole position will be a knockdown dragout of epic proportions with a bit of luck, but it was Leclerc in 7th that particularly impressed, as Ferrari's latest side hustle apparently got busy over break and is rapidly looking to supplant HAAS in the Italian marque's affectations. Perez too was seriously quick, and the pair of them look to animate the midfield battle in tomorrow's race.

Once again a feature is the sensor at the top of the hill, which will potentially see times deleted, as it's an automatic call for the stewards. Less likely to feature tomorrow as the laptimes will be slower due to higher fuel, along with fuel and tyre management. On the way to the grid, it was a reprimand for Bottas (naughty, naughty Finn) for his obliviousness to Vandoorne in FP3 as the teams completed their last minute checks and prepared to hit the track

Summary

Green Light!! Gasly, Grosjean and Magnussen were off straight away, with a threat of rain hanging over the rather sunny circuit (don't ask, it's Belgium) then Leclerc and Hamilton, first of the big boys to kick off. Hartley, Raikkonen, Ericsson and Vettel followed at a fairly short interval and the sharp end all sported yellow Softs on their wheels. As the first runners approached the start/finish it was Grosjean leading the way, then Magnussen and Gasly.

Early days it was Magnussen king of the purples in the midfield trio, shortlived as it was due to Hamilton coming through. Raikkonen was faster then Vettel faster still through S1, by several tenths. At the end of the lap, Grosjean managed to be faster with a solid S2 and momentarily was top of the timing chart.

Hamilton 1:43.543 ended that, followed by Raikkonen nearly a second faster (on the same tyres) and then Vettel slotted between the two, P2 and half a second off. Lewis was sent round again for "learning" despite having set a time good enough to progress according to his engineers.

11 minutes to go and Verstappen was on it, RBR running the Supers and roughly on a pace to Vettel through the first two sectors, but wound up 0.2s off Sebastian's time, albeit with a step softer tyre compound helping out.

Hulkenberg, due to start at the back tomorrow thanks to his new equipment, cracked off a P6, and was rapidly eclipsed by Ocon, Perez and Leclerc in that order, leaving him 8th and a mere thousandth between the to Force India teammates. As that was settled, Hamilton was back on it and ran a significantly better 1:42.977, going P2 ahead of Vettel.

Mysteriously, Ricciardo managed to go just P10, his struggles not improving with the news of his departure (optional tinfoil available free of charge for subscribers /joke) and Mercedes kicked Bottas out into the lull created as the teams at risk for being dropped were in the pits getting ready for their last shot that the glories of Q2. Sirotkin, Stroll, Vandoorne, Alonso and Ericsson were all in that zone and as they took to the grid, Kmag was given a tow by his teammate which launched him up to P7 and Grosjean to P6. That forced Ricciardo back out the door for another go with less than 3 minutes to go as he had dropped to P13 as he sat in the pits.

Stroll was first off for the backmarkers, but it was Sirotkin looking racy and managed P18 after running wide. The board was lighting up green and it was Leclerc to P7, Ericsson to P10, as both Alonso and somewhat shockingly Carlos Sainz were unable to make Q2. He had one mistake in S2 that pretty much did him in, complaining on the radio of a lack of rear grip, whatever change they made having made in between his runs having apparently not improved things. Ricciardo barely made P7 but it was enough for him to live to fight another day.

Not so lucky were Sainz, Alonso, Sirotkin, Stroll and Vandoorne, who were off in search of some waffles as the rest turned it around for the trials and tribulations of Q2.

The second qualifying session started with Raikkonen, Hamilton, Vettel, Ricciardo and Hartley out first, the battle of the titans not wasting much time with the long outlap required due to the length of the circuit. Hamilton complained of a tyre vibration. Through the bus stop went Raikkonen with 12:30 to go and it was on. Purples for Kimi in S1, Hamilton down slightly under 0.2s off with Vettel crushing it and taking the fastest of all, nearly 4 tenths up on the Mercedes. Hamilton answered with a purple S2 but not enough as the contest hurtled towards the last sector. Raikkonen was first up with a 1:41.627 and a new track record, Hamilton P2 0.184 seconds back of Kimi and a surprise from Vettel, with a bit of an average S3 leaving him 0.506 seconds behind and P3. Bottas and Hulkenberg didn't bother to run, as they were starting at the back and it was HAAS reclaiming best of the rest with half the session left to run, followed by Force India and then Gasly, benefitting from the lack of running by the 2 drivers starting at the back saving tyres.

Hartley, Leclerc and Ericsson, were the three with something to prove, and as they turned it around for one more go, a dark cloud was reported in S2 and the odds that rain would enliven things a bit for Q3 apparently jumped significantly higher. This pushed HAAS to get out the door a bit earlier than planned. Ericsson was out of the car, however, for reasons unknown and his day was done, leaving just Hartley and Leclerc to do battle from the dropzone. Raikkonen and Vettel were out the door and quelle surprise it was Bottas making a surprise appearance, and the possibility that they would use Bottas to slipstream Hamilton in Q3 was the immediate speculation. Bad news for Gasly, though, as he was the current possessor of P10.

Off they went on their hotlaps. Hartley had a spin in Turn 1 and that was that for him. Vettel, slipstreaming Raikkonen, went P1 as Bottas went P4. putting Gasly out. Hamilton improved, but with no slipstream he was down to P3, again with a purple S2 though. On the outside looking in were Gasly, Hartley, Leclerc, Ericsson and Hulkenberg. Off for a soul restoring Trippel they went, as on replay Hartley's spin appeared to be perhaps not entirely his fault. Along with that, reports of rain alongside the track and in the pits were numerous, but not entirely confirmed and even the fans seemed unsure of what to do.

However, from a strategy point of view, with Hamilton just 0.052 seconds off Vettel, the slipstream appeared the way forward and his only real shot at pole position would be down to teamwork, an unusual situation and raising some interesting (and speculative) questions about whether that would be a bill he'd have to repay at Monza.

As the session was about to open, the rain had stopped, but there was another shower reported to be 7 minutes away. As the queue formed, it was Bottas ahead of Hamilton, but Vettel had somehow managed to wedge himself inbetween the two. Rain in T8 and as the pits opened, Hamilton rocked by Vettel and Mercedes was on it hard. As they rolled around for the outlap, the wind picked up and the rain had officially arrived. Verstappen nearly had an off and then Bottas lost it at Blanchimont and into the pits they came for Inters. 
CHAOS for everyone as Ocon and Perez carried on. Confusion at Ferrari as they weren't sure whether to wheel them into the garage or not, perhaps needing some fuel onboard. Perez had a brutally lurid moment and as they approached the pits they chose to come in for Inters rather than complete their lap. Ricciardo was first on it as RBR just swapped tyres, no fuel thank you, and he was off the track at Les Combes, and through the runoff, leaving Verstappen behind as the first runner on a hot lap.

S1 to Verstappen, and he was faster than Raikkonen behind, and the message from Ferrari was the hardest rain was done. 2:02.849 for Verstappen and Raikkonen outdid that by about 2 tenths, again gaining ground in S3. Hamilton was on a very safe lap, picking it up in S3 and going purple there and taking P3. With just over 3 minutes left he and the rest would have 2 more laps to get it done as conditions changed rapidly.

Vettel was through and P1, but still in the 2:02's. Hamilton, pushing hard was off at Fagne with too much speed, leaving himself a sole shot at pole as he had dropped to P5 as the rest of the field came through in the now improving but far from safe conditions. Vettel, meanwhile, had rocked it through in a 2:01.188. Raikkonen and both Red Bulls had pitted with time left, but it was Ocon coming through as the last seconds rolled off the clock who purpled S1. Perez up to P2 as Hamilton swept by, with a crushing 1:58.179, and Vettel still out. Ocon to P3 just a tenth faster than his teammate and Vettel, who lost 0.4 seconds through S2, was unable to makeup the difference in the last sector so it was Hamilton, Vettel and yes, OCON at the top, followed by Perez and Grosjean. Ferrari lost out massively with Raikkonen's early pit, likely due to being short fueled and it was Kimi, Verstappen, Ricciardo, Magnussen and Bottas finishing off the top 10. The Red Bulls were also in the pits when they could've done another lap in improving conditions, and that was almost certainly due to the fact they didn't refuel the cars when they switched to Inters, a fact that was confirmed after the session.

Well now, regardless of weather, tomorrow's race will be full of intrigue with a mixed up grid and not entirely slow Force India's locking out the second row of the grid. Ocon's P3 interview was decidedly a highlight for the crowd and it certainly won't hurt his value in the driver sweepstakes. Bottas and Hulkenberg from the back will make life interesting as well, and of course, it's being Spa who knows what will really happen, weatherwise. The Racing Gods have smiled on the fans once again for todays's qualifying and all indications are tomorrow's race will continue our good fortune...

Discuss!!

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13 Aug 2018
Energy Recovery System fundamentals and taking a look at Ferrari’s gains

If you’re a fan of my long rambling posts then you’re in for a treat, as this is going to be just that. However, what I’ll try to do is segment it off in order that you can take it in, in smaller, more digestible chunks.
  • ERS Explainer
  • Ferrari’s twin battery
  • Free energy tricks & Extra Harvest mode
  • Free load mode / Supercharger mode
  • Potential rear wing ‘stall’
The main idea behind this post is to clarify some of the details and inaccuracies I’ve noted in regard to Ferrari’s alleged powerunit gains. Seeing and being part of various discussions it has become painfully obvious to me that there is somewhat of a knowledge vacuum when it comes to people’s understanding of even the fundamental parts and operation of the Energy Recovery System (ERS).

It’s a failing of the sport, the FIA, the promoters, the teams and the media as they’re not able to elegantly portray the various machinations of the regulations at hand.

I have over the years looked to make these things more understandable with various articles debunking myths that have cropped up and also created a video in 2014 explaining some of the energy flow situations.

I’m a small voice in a very large void though and so I’d urge anyone that’s a fan of the sport, that knows another fan of the sport to read this article, as I attempt to simplify the way in which the ERS works.

Let’s start with the hardware, as understanding the role each of these devices play is fundamental in understanding the overall system.

The MGUK is an electric motor attached to the engines crankshaft and can either recover energy under braking or increase the engines output under acceleration. It has a total output of 120kw (roughly 160bhp).

The MGUH is another electric motor, but this one is paired with the turbocharger in order that energy can be recovered (harvested) when the turbo is spun too hard for the load required of it, or it can be used to spin the turbo to keep it in the optimum speed range.

The Energy Store (ES) is a battery pack housed beneath the driver and offers storage for energy recovered by the the two MGU’s.

At this point I’m going to ask that you forget the fairytales that you’ve read/heard in the past and try to focus on this as if you’ve never even heard of the ERS, as frankly the 4MJ limit and 33.33 seconds of energy usage I continue to read/hear/see are nonsense (and have covered previously).
 
Let’s take a look at the energy flow diagram from the regulations, as this gives us an accurate picture of what can be done. I’ll start with the basics and then we’ll move onto the more complex energy avenues later.

The MGUK can expend energy up to a rate of 120kw (roughly 160bhp) and unlike KERS, which was a simple power boost, is used as part of the powerunits overall output and mapped alongside the pedal map to produce power as requested by the driver via the accelerator pedal. It can spend 4MJ of energy that’s been stored in the ES per lap (this is where the 33.33 second misnomer came from) but can also draw an unlimited supply of energy from the MGUH through the MGU CONTROL UNIT. However, it can only recover and store 2MJ of energy per lap in the ES.

Perhaps the easiest way to understand the MGUK is that the team and moreover the driver will want the full 120kw/160bhp at their disposal for as much of the lap that is possible (as long as they’re not traction limited) as without it they’re a sitting duck. In order to get that 120kw they will demand it from the ES and MGUH, both of which are programmed to supply energy in a way that is beneficial to the laps overall energy landscape.

That means that although the MGUK is being fed 120kw it could be getting 60kw from the ES and 60kw from the MGUH (or 40/80kw, or any other ratio for that matter). The more energy that can instantaneously be transferred to the MGUK by the MGUH the better, as this extends the depletion ratio from the ES, extending the generally accepted 4MJ/33.33 second figures.

By now you should have realised just how important the MGUH is in the overall energy scheme, as it’s responsible for the ‘infill’ of energy that the MGUK is limited by. Furthermore, the hardware is of little significance when compared with the software, which has to be programmed with various (many of which might seem counter-intuitive) scenarios in mind.

So, let’s play out a scenario in order to explain how the components interact with one another.

Braking into and accelerating out of a slow speed corner/hairpin

  • As the car slows into the corner the MGUK will recover energy, sending some of it to the ES for use later in the lap and the rest directly to the MGUH to keep the turbocharger spooled and in the optimum window for the acceleration phase.
  • Accelerating out of the corner (once no longer traction limited) the MGUK will request the full 120kw to help propel the car forward. The MGU-H, having already kept the turbocharger ‘alive’, will start to recover some energy and send it directly to the MGUK, whilst energy is deployed from the ES to supplement it.
  • As the car accelerates out onto the straight the MGUH will continue to recover energy and feed it to both the MGUK and ES, topping up the latter for use elsewhere around the lap.
As you can see in this fairly innocuous example there is a lot going on, all of which requires the two MGU’s to perpetually feed energy around the system so it performs as expected around the entirety of a lap. In fact it’s the transitional phases throughout a lap that make all of this seem like somewhat of a ‘dark art’, as it’s not a simple and binary energy recovery and deployment tool likes KERS used to be.

As an aside there are a couple of these transitional moments that I’d like to cover in order that you might be able to understand just how pivotal ERS is in the overall powerunit scheme.

It may be strategically advantageous (both from an energy point of view and overall car performance) to recover energy via the MGUK in traction zones, and before you say it, no, it’s not traction control, rather a way of limiting the powerunits overall output and affording the MGUK an opportunity to feed the MGUH and/or ES energy.

Lifting and coasting, whilst normally associated with fuel saving, is another avenue where energy can be recovered by the MGUK and passed to the MGUH for instantaneous use or sent to the ES for later deployment.

Overcoming the cars aerodynamic drag is pivotal in delivering lap time during qualifying, meaning the powerunit will be run at full tilt, but during a race the team/driver will usually opt for a different strategy, forsaking absolute vMax. This often leads to partial throttle being used in order to save fuel and energy (similar to a lift and coast but with more nuance).

On the flip side of these scenarios, the driver can find himself in a position where he doesn’t have enough total energy for the desired demand. Perhaps he’s been running in an incorrect mode or mounted a sustained attack on another driver that has expended more energy than is desirable from the ES’s allocation. Failure to make up this ‘lost’ energy may result in a phenomenon you may have heard before but not fully understood - Derating or a Derate

This is when the driver is requesting the full 120kw energy allotment from the MGUK but the ES and/or MGUH are unable to supply it for the entire time it’s being requested, as explained by Andy Cowell from Mercedes HPP below.



Each circuit will provide an entirely different challenge for the drivers and engineers as they strive to find the perfect way around a lap. Oftentimes it will require sacrifice in one corner or straight in order that the laps overall energy strategy is not compromised, which brings me to another misunderstood concept - SoC.

The other issue that has perhaps led to the assumption that drivers only have 4MJ of energy at their disposal per lap is the SoC (State of Charge) statement relating to energy in and out of the battery pack (ES) per lap.

“The difference between the maximum and minimum state of charge of the ES may not exceed 4MJ at any time the car is on track”.

This simply means that if you started at zero on lap 1 you can’t have more than 4MJ in the ES, but the energy can fluctuate between those figures throughout the course of a lap/race. Think of it like a bank account - you can keep depositing smaller amounts and spending different amounts as long as the sum total does not exceed 4MJ.

This means the amount of energy passing through the ES per lap is only limited by the MGUH’s ability to recover energy, as the MGUK can only recover and store 2MJ (through conventional methods, we’ll get to this interesting caveat shortly).

For 2018 drivers can only use two ES’s per season before being penalized, which puts even more emphasis on their reliability. The ES is a densely packed, liquid-cooled lithium-ion battery made up by a number of cells which will degrade over a period of time and become less or totally ineffective (dead cells), meaning the strategy for using these cells is imperative. The manufacturer will clearly spec the battery pack well beyond the 4MJ hard limit that many associate with the ES, with the overall pack weight really the deciding factor in how much storage can be crammed in there.  

Ferrari’s twin battery layout

From Ferrari’s point of view they’ve opted (since 2014) to run what is known as a twin battery arrangement, but recently, having made large strides up the grid, the team have seen everything they do put under the microscope.
Ferrari's energy store, which ordinarily resides under the driver, was captured here by Craig Scarborough in Abu Dhabi last season, Craig kindly allowed me to use the image
Physically the battery is still only one unit but it’s my understanding that it’s viewed as two ‘virtual’ batteries by the software, potentially improving energy and heat management between it and the two MGU’s.

As such, clarification was sought by various teams and powerunit manufacturers over the use of this battery layout after it was suggested that Ferrari had found a way to exceed the MGUK’s maximum 120kw deployment rate, with a 20bhp figure being put on it. That would require the MGUK to be supplied 135kw, which is clearly beyond the scope of the regulations and something that Ferrari have since been cleared of.

This all came about because the data collected by other teams suggests they’re doing something counterintuitive and not occuring every lap but seems to arise in the secondary phase of acceleration out of a corner.

‘Free energy tricks’

Ferrari, having been cleared of any excessive energy deployment via the MGUK by the FIA have still been the subject of much debate. Nico Rosberg was next in line to throw mud at Ferrari, suggesting he had some ‘insider information’ about a ‘free energy trick’ being employed by the Scuderia (https://streamable.com/vh89e) that was giving them an advantage over Mercedes.

Technically nothing is for free, it just means that Ferrari have found a way to operate the physical hardware within the regulations in a different, or perhaps counterintuitively, when compared to their rivals. But, in short he’s talking about the advantage that can be gained from the MGUH, as it passes energy directly to the MGUK. It’s nothing that at a base level that’s not already understood but that doesn’t mean you can’t get better at it...

It got me to thinking about a less than obvious energy trick that Honda dragged out into the light in 2016 - Extra Harvest Mode. This little nugget of information came via Motor Fan illustrated (a Japanese publication) and showed that if you don’t explicitly write something down in the regulations the teams and manufacturers will exploit it.
 
It’s a concept that all the manufacturers are believed to be using and that Honda developed and implemented during 2016. Whilst its effect has lessened since (less time on the brakes for harvesting, due to the increase in downforce) it shows that the energy flow diagram can be overcome.

The idea is that you defeat the MGUK’s 2MJ recovery and storage limit to the ES by cycling it through the MGUH, as it both simultaneously deploys and recovers energy (quickly switching between recovery and deployment (ON>OFF) in order to maintain boost pressure and recover energy).

In the example Honda suggest an extra 1MJ of energy is recovered by the MGUK, sent directly to the MGUH for use but immediately recovered and sent to the ES for storage. This trick would only be limited by the amount of energy that can be recovered by the MGUK in the course of a lap and the efficiency and ability of the MGUH to transfer that energy to the ES (which would also have to stay within the SoC limit).

The use of this ‘extra harvest mode’ also opens up the possibility of turning the energy flow in the opposite direction, cycling energy from the ES via the MGUH (OFF>ON) to the MGUK, thus exceeding the Max 4MJ from ES to MGUK.

These methods make a mockery of the regulations designed to constrain the MGUK’s interaction with the ES but have inadvertently led the manufacturers to find ways in which to improve the efficiency of the MGUH and ERS system as a whole.

It’s worth bearing in mind that the ability to recover and store any energy, but particularly this ‘extra’ energy, will fluctuate at each circuit due to the time in corners or on a straight. It’s also affected by other factors, including but not limited to - individual driving style, current fuel targets/ICE operation/modes, car weight and traffic.

Free load mode / Electric supercharger mode

Another area of interest for me is the way in which the wastegate is opened, allowing the turbocharger to be driven electrically by the MGUH, which reduces back pressure and improves the ICE’s output. It’s a strategy we see employed more often during qualifying, as energy management is less critical but often see’s drivers having to do a charge up lap either after a flier or preparing the car during the out lap.

It’s a little more nuanced than simply driving the turbo with the MGUH permanently, with an energy strategy devised that will give the driver the best potential lap time. When you hear the teams or media talk about “Qualifying mode” or “Party mode” this is a key factor in those modes, with fuel and energy maximised for a full on assault.  

You’ll note an audible difference when the wastegates are opened as the exhaust gasses are now escaping in a different way, whilst the turbo is being driven more linearly by the MGUH. It’s become apparent that Ferrari have started to use this mode in short bursts during race situations too, which often see’s their drivers topping the speed traps. Clearly this is advantageous from an overall laptime perspective but it comes at the expense of energy management, meaning it cannot be done lap after lap (at this stage at least). It may come with some minor advantages in terms of fuel economy and/or reliability too but essentially everything that’s done with these powerunits is a trade off.
The audible difference is not something that isn’t ordinarily picked up by the broadcast camera’s / microphones but in the following trackside footage you can hear the difference.



In this great video by Bozzy (he’s definitely worth subscribing to if you don’t already) it can be heard numerous times. But as some quick reference points watch and more importantly listen at 1:02 and 3.55.



This more recent video (from Hungary) also has the audible note change at around 0.17 onwards.

Blown or stalled rear wing

I feel that explaining free load / electric supercharger / qualifying mode was an important task in its own right but, the other reason I did this was to enforce an idea that I’ve already put out there - using the wastegates to ‘stall’ the rear wing. The article kind of of explains the premise but I’d like to add some more thoughts here whilst we are at it.

Again, I’ll also reiterate that this is speculative in nature, others have condemned the idea and I can understand that too, it’s just that the swing toward using the wastegate in the opening phase of the straight at least for me makes it plausible.
This speed plot from Tobi Gruner of AMuS gives us a snapshot of where Ferrari are reportedly faster and got me to thinking about how you could gain top speed, but not directly from the powerunit which is everyone else's immediate leap.

My immediate thought was to turn to a reduction in drag, especially as the concept is still fresh in everyone's minds from the F-Duct and DRD used during the V8 era. However, with no additional/supplementary hardware present around the rear wing to cause a ‘stall’ it seemed unlikely. This did not deter me though (I can be stubborn) and so I tried to think about how using the engine as a pump you might be able to at least cause a destabilisation of the airflow that could lead to a stall.

Of course I had the example of DRD to work with and the fact that the ‘active’ version I’d proposed back in 2015, when the wastegate pipework was originally decoupled from the main exhaust outlet, was also possible, until it wasn’t.... In fact I have a copy of the technical directive that was issued to cover questions that Ferrari required clarification on, in which Charlie subsequently made the idea a non-starter.

What if you didn’t need the pipework though? what if you could cause enough hysteria in the local airflow that the rear wing would lose downforce and with it some of the drag penalty?

In short the exhaust, due to its placement, currently has an influence on the aerodynamic airflow structures it touches (rear wing and diffuser airflow structures ‘talk to one another’, creating an upwash behind the car). Renault use the exhaust to blow the underside of their rear wing, improving downforce at lower speeds, something they’ve tried to enhance by reducing its proximity to the mainplane (which also features heat protection to guard against the increased temperatures it might encounter).

The use of the exhaust flow to drive aerodynamic performance is something teams have been doing for decades, with the rules constantly in a state of flux in order to guard against the activity. Of course, the use of exhaust blown diffusers, during the latter stages of the V8 era is part of the reason why the FIA decided to fix the single exhaust position along the cars centreline, but that doesn’t stop teams trying to gain an advantage.

It’s why the FIA reduced the scope of monkey seat winglets this season, reducing how the localised airflow could be manipulated along with the plume / jet of air that is ejected from the exhaust to improve the diffuser and rear wings performance.

Ok, enough of blowing exhausts for downforce, as we’ve generally accepted that it’s possible, so let’s turn our attention back to stalling the rear wing. The first thing I’ll ask you to note is that whenever teams have looked to do this, they’ve also chosen to add more downforce/drag by running a more aggressive rear wing, as why wouldn’t you take the extra downforce for for little or no drag penalty?..

Ferrari appear to have been doing just that, running more aggressive wing angles than Mercedes, whilst conversely topping the speed traps. Of course, this can be explained away by a difference in overall chassis efficiency or simply more power but it was also that this performance doesn’t seem available lap-after-lap.

So, if we take what we’ve learnt about free load or electric supercharger mode and apply that logic to what’s happening with the wasted exhaust gases we can conclude that you could disturb the natural flow to the underside of the rear wing and potentially cause a reduction in downforce and drag.

Yup, before you say it, I’ve already considered that by virtue of everyone doing this, to some extent, during qualifying with a full-on free load mode use they’d all see the ‘stall’ benefit, but I’d argue that its potential would ordinarily be hampered by a reluctance to run higher rear wing angles of attack that would compromise them in race conditions.

Ferrari, if my assertions are correct have found a way to use more of the free load / electric supercharger mode during race conditions too, which means they’re actively sacrificing some electrical energy for an aerodynamic advantage.
Giorgio Piola captured the wastegate arrangement as the car was torn down after the test in FP1, note the lower wastegate pipe is merely there to comply with the regulations and isn't directly connected, rather merged with the upper pipe

Their yet unraced new rear wing and wastegate position could also add more smoke to this fire, with the wings central geometry less than conventional. You’ll note the leading edge of the mainplane is upturned in the image above, but it also features an odd camber on the underside shown in the image below (highlighted by the shape of the rear wings slot gap separator and marked in yellow by me). Both images were taken by Giorgio Piola when the design was installed on Sebastian Vettel’s car during FP1 at the German GP. 
A rear view of the wastegate setup (red arrow) and the oddly cambered mainplane (line added in yellow to define the surface change) was captured by Giorgio Piola
 
The general consensus at the time was that Ferrari were testing a high downforce configuration that could be run at a latter point in the season. However, I’d argue the opposite and that in fact we have more chance of seeing it (or a derivative thereof) used at the lower downforce circuits (Spa and Monza), as they mitigate the downforce gains from running the wing by being able to ‘stall’ - reduce downforce and drag through better placement of the wastegate pipes (now installed vertically above the exhaust, rather than either side of it).

Conclusion

I hope this article has been able to break down some of the barriers that have been forged over the years about what I would class as some of the more basic functions of the ERS, whilst also adding further depth on what can be achieved if you take a more sideways view of the regulations.

The gains made by Ferrari over the last few seasons have been astounding but rather than being considered 'cheats' they should be lauded for their brilliance and ingenuity. Afterall, we've all marvelled over Mercedes dominance between 2014-2016, so the Scuderia's resurgence should be admired too.

If you liked this post please consider supporting me via Patreon, I provide some Patron only and early access content on my page, with the money going a long way to me achieving my ultimate goals.
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2 Aug 2018
Planning and adapting for the perfect race through tactics and strategy

  • Thursday, August 02, 2018
  • 1
As we watch the drama of an F1 race unfold, we try to follow the narrative that’s defined by both strategic and tactical decisions made by the driver and the pitwall. Many watching at home will second guess decisions made by the team, on the pitwall and back at the factory, and see them as tactical rather than strategic, but how we tell the difference? And what do they see that we don’t?..

Some races are extremely straight forward and require only strategic thinking but the Hungarian GP conspired to give us tactical elements too, so, let’s delve into how the race unfolded and see what was done by the lead pair as they continue to fight tooth and nail for victories.

The first thing of note was that a wet qualifying session gave the teams and drivers more dry weather tyres to choose from and more importantly a free choice on the tyre compound that they started the race with.
Pirelli supply these infograhics ahead of each race in order that we know how many and what compound of tyres each driver has left in their allocation
 
Starting from the front, both Mercedes drivers opted for the Ultra Soft tyre, the grippiest but lower life tyre in the range. They did so as the tyre warms up quicker and drops into the tyres working range more efficiently (90-110o C), meaning that it should offer more purchase from the grid slot at the start and then offer more grip in the opening stint of the race. Of course this comes at the expense of longevity but we’ll see how that plays out in due course.

Ferrari made their first tactical decision at the start of the race, when they decided to use different tyre compounds for their drivers, outfitting Raikkonen (starting P3) on the Ultra Soft like the Mercedes, whilst Vettel was given the Soft tyre. The Soft tyre takes longer to warm up and has a higher working range (105-135o C), which means it degrades slower than the Ultra soft, giving the team and driver different strategic options overall.

Mercedes stayed on ‘Plan A’ for Hamilton, running as far as possible on the Ultra Soft (lap 25) before starting to lose pace relative to the chasing pack, followed by a long second stint on the Soft, assisted by running in free air, aside for when lapping traffic.

Raikkonen’s race was one defined by forceful tactical moves, the first being a relatively short stint on the Ultra Soft tyre, as the Finn headed for the pitlane at the end of lap 14. This was clearly a ploy by Ferrari to usurp Bottas and gain track position with the undercut (the undercut is when you stop earlier than your rival and use the fresh rubber to maximise laptime and be ahead of the them after their pitstop).

Raikkonen’s stop was slow though, as the team had to dislodge some rubber that had built up in one of the brake ducts (another reason for the early stop, as this may have pushed temperatures into the critical zones if he continued for too long).

Shadowing his stop, Valtteri Bottas stopped on lap 15, even though the team had considered running longer due to Raikkonen’s slow stop they covered it off, in case they took had a poor stop. Both drivers took the Soft tyre, which essentially consigned them to what at the time seemed like a 2-stop strategy, with the Soft tyre unexpected to make the 56/55 laps needed to make it to the end of the race.

The resultant pitstops freed Vettel, who’d been bottlenecked behind the two Finn’s as their tyre performance waned. Knowing that Vettel needed to run the quicker, but faster degrading Ultra Soft tyre in his last stint the team were obviously eager for him to run the Soft as far into the race as was possible, giving him less time on the quicker tyre but meaning he could extract his maximum each lap.
As Vettel crossed the line to start lap 32 he was still an adjusted pit stop* ahead of Bottas, whilst Hamilton, having stopped was 14.502 seconds behind, meaning pit stop adjusted he was currently around 6 seconds adrift of the Brit.

* The teams monitor the GPS position of their cars and others and using the adjusted pitstop loss (time it takes to enter the pitlane, complete an average pitstop (around 2.5 seconds) and return to the track) in order to judge when it’s best to feed their driver back in, limiting the traffic they’ll have to encounter as they exit. You’ll often hear this referred to as the ‘Pit Window’, if a driver is referred to as being outside of another's pit window they will not impact their strategy. However, if they’re in their window the driver needs to find pace or hope the other loses some.

This is where the wheels started to come off the German’s strategy though, as his long stint length meant he would come across and have to overtake a cluster of backmarkers, whilst maintaining the kind of pace that would keep Bottas out of his pit stop window. He actually made light work of it in the early part, passing Nico Hulkenberg on lap 32, Hartley on lap 33 and as he passed the Ferrari powered Haas of Grosjean on lap 35 the pit stop window had actually increased to just over 25 seconds. It was Sainz and Ocon then that did the most damage, as they were busy squabbling with each other.

By the time he’d passed Ocon on lap 38 the gap to Bottas had dropped to 22 seconds and Hamilton had eeked out his adjusted time to around 11 seconds. Of course, this is not all traffic related as you must realise that the Mercedes drivers now had the Soft tyres that were giving more performance than Vettel’s softer but more worn Softs. This is what we call the crossover - the point at which the rate of performance of one tyre exceeds the other.
Seeing the inevitable unfold in front of them Ferrari deployed another tactic on lap 38, calling in Kimi Raikkonen for another set of tyres and officially signalling a 2-stop race for him. What may have seemed odd about this is that they put the Finn on a set of used Soft tyres, rather than a set of Ultra’s. However, if we refer to the available sets at the start of the race (top) we can see that he only had a used set of Ultra Softs left in his allocation (albeit there is a mistake in that graphic, as the second set of Soft’s used by Kimi were also used, which is adjusted in the graphic above)

Putting Raikkonen on a newer set of tyres would make the Ferrari driver a different prospect on his final stint. But more importantly it was a ploy to make Mercedes respond with Bottas, clearing him out of Vettel’s pit window. With a roughly 20 second pit stop loss it would mean that if Mercedes didn’t fall for it he’d need to make up that time on track and clear Bottas who’d be struggling for grip at the end of the race.

Mercedes didn’t bite and played their own tactical shell game, staying out and opting for track position, safe in the knowledge that both Ferrari’s would have to make up time and pass their man on track. The roll of the dice though is that by the end of the race, Bottas would be on tyres that had done 55 laps, a figure beyond Pirelli’s expectations.

Vettel’s pre stop traffic and pace loss dramas were compounded when he made his stop on lap 39 for the Ultra Soft tyre, as he too had a slow pitstop, with the front left slow to go on his stationary time was 4.2 seconds, making what would have been a very close battle into turn one an easier proposition for Bottas, who regained second place.

Vettel decided at this early stage of his second stint that Hamilton, having checked out at the front, was now out of reach and he’d instead lay in wait for Bottas’ tyres to go off and pounce later in the stint.

Mercedes did have a window of opportunity at the end of lap (51) to pit Bottas to make a second stop, as a VSC (Virtual Safety Car) period was called to clear Vandorne’s stricken McLaren. A VSC period offers an interesting opportunity for the teams and drivers as the time lost in the pit lane is negated by cars traveling at pitlane speeds out on track*.

This means the only real loss is the stationary time whilst the car is serviced, which can be made up to some extent by an aggressive pit entry and exit, as these are strictly classified as being on track.

Mercedes once again made a tactical decision, opting to stay out on worn tyres and retain track position. Had Bottas have pitted they felt they’d relinquish the chance of a 1-2 finish, as they too would be stuck behind the Ferrari pairing of Vettel and Raikkonen even on much fresher tyres (referring to the tyre allocation chart they’d have only had worn tyres to choose from though).

* The caveat here is that if the driver makes a stop and the VSC period ends during that stop he will inevitably lose time. As such, Mercedes were monitoring the recovery of the stricken McLaren and their GPS data to ensure that they weren’t caught out by this.
As we can see, the wouldn’t have been, as the McLaren still wasn’t cleared off the track by the time they passed around and so we were still under a VSC.

The rest as they say is history now, as the ensuing changes for position were made on track as part of a tactical battle between the drivers, which of course Bottas lost out in, having seen his tyres reach their performance cliff.

I hope this article has helped anyone that has perhaps struggled to understand the difference between overall race strategy and tactical decisions made during a race, whilst also giving some insight into adjusted pit stop losses, pit windows and VSC periods that affect the aforementioned.

As always if you want to support my work you can do so like my other Patrons for as little as $1 per month - www.Patreon.com/SomersF1

As a side note an easy way to work out whether a driver is in anothers 'pit window' is to use the driver interval board and work out the culmative gap. Let's say that the pit time loss is a hard 20 seconds it would mean that if Vettel pitted he'd come out 6 or so seconds behind Hamilton, meaning he's in his window (marked in red). Whilst Bottas is 24.491 seconds behind, giving Vettel some margin to stop and remain in front of the Finn (marked in green). You can make this visual assumption very quickly for all drivers up and down the field if you have a rough idea of the pit stop loss.
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